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Target Date Funds and Portfolio Choice in 401(k) Plans  
 
Although U.S. employers are legally responsible for selecting and overseeing investment options 
in the 401(k) plans offered to their workers, employees have traditionally been responsible for selecting 
their own portfolios given the fund menus offered.1 A concern with this approach is that many participants 
appear to be ill-equipped to make these portfolio decisions, potentially undermining old-age retirement 
security, due to financial illiteracy or behavioral biases.2  
This paper shows how the introduction of target date funds (TDFs) into 401(k) plans has 
fundamentally altered the decision-making dynamic in U.S. defined contribution retirement saving plans. 
A target date fund menu consists of a series of fund offerings with portfolio allocations described in terms 
of an expected year of retirement; usually offered in five-year increments (e.g., a 2015, 2020, etc., fund), a 
target date fund series may include up to a dozen funds. Participants in voluntary choice plans must actively 
select among target date and other fund offerings; by contrast, a participant in an automatic enrollment plan 
is initially defaulted into a single target date fund based on the employee’s current age and assumed 
retirement date (usually age 65), with the option to move to other investments subsequently.  
Target date fund assets in 401(k) plans have grown phenomenally over time, from $5B in 2000 to 
$734B in 2018 (ICI, 2019). In part, this growth was spurred by a Department of Labor regulation issued 
under the 2006 Pension Protection Act designating target date funds as an eligible default investment option 
for automatic enrollment plans.3  By 2018, 80 percent of 401(k) plans offered these funds (ICI, 2019), and 
                                                 
1 Here we use the term 401(k) plans to refer broadly to private-sector defined contribution plans which can include 
profit-sharing, money purchase, and 403(b) plans along with 401(k) plans.  
2 Research on the role of financial illiteracy and behavioral biases in investing and savings decisions includes Bekaert, 
Hoyem, Hu, and Ravina (2017), Benartzi and Thaler (2001. 2002), Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2018), 
Goda, Levy, Manchester, Sojourner and Tasoff (2019), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011, 2104), Mitchell and Lusardi 
(2011), Mottola and Utkus (2008), Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnenberg (2016), and van Rooij, Lusardi, 
and Alessie (2011).    
3 The Department of Labor regulations were effective December 24, 2007. 72 Fed. Reg. 60451. Eligible “qualified 
default investment alternatives” (QDIAs) include target date funds, traditional balanced funds, and managed account 
advice services. QDIA regulations provide sponsors so-called 404(c) protection for participant portfolio choices, 
meaning there is a presumption that employers are not liable for participant portfolio decisions when participants hold 
QDIAs. The sponsor retains liability for selecting and monitoring the QDIA itself.   
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two-thirds of new 401(k) plan entrants were automatically enrolled, with target funds the dominant choice 
for default investments (Vanguard, 2019). This rising reliance on automatic enrollment and default portfolio 
choice in the U.S. conforms to a global move toward default portfolio choice in defined contribution 
systems (OECD, 2015).   
Compared to other multi-asset class portfolios such as traditional balanced and risk-based lifecycle 
funds, a target date family offers retirement savers two unique advice-related features. First, each fund is 
identified with an anticipated retirement year which serves as an implicit recommendation regarding which 
types of investors should hold each fund. If investors must make their own portfolio choices, the date 
labeling transforms a potentially complex decision about how to assemble a portfolio with the available 
funds on the menu into a simpler decision heuristic, namely to simply select the fund associated with the 
employee’s anticipated retirement date. 4  Second, target date risk levels are automatically rebalanced over 
time by fund managers who follow an “equity glide path,” reducing risk as participants near their target 
dates. 5  
In what follows, we evaluate how the introduction of target date funds into 401(k) investment 
menus has reshaped participants’ portfolio choice decisions, drawing on an anonymized, restricted-access 
longitudinal dataset from Vanguard, a major 401(k) plan administrator and investment manager. The target 
date funds we study are almost exclusively indexed portfolios, diversified across global equity and fixed 
asset classes, with management fees under 20 basis points. As a result, our dataset represents a real-world 
benchmark for the provision of low-cost, highly diversified professional portfolio advice to an important 
group of nonprofessional investors.  
To assess the impact of target date fund introduction, we examine participant adoption and portfolio 
exposures one year after the first appearance of the funds in the 401(k) investment menus.  We show that 
                                                 
4 Prior to the advent of target date funds, no investment funds provided age-related rebalancing in 401(k) 
plans. 
5 Here we take no stance on the desirability of a declining equity share with age. Some analysts favor it based on labor 
income profiles with age (e,g., Campbell and Viceira, 2002; Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005), while others do not 
(e.g., Basu, Byrne and Drew, 2011).   
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28.4 percent of new entrants into voluntary enrollment plans adopted target date funds in their retirement 
saving accounts, whereas only 10.2 percent of existing employees (workers in the plan prior to the funds’ 
appearance) switched out of existing investments into these funds. This difference we describe as an active 
choice effect, reflecting the fact that new entrants in voluntary enrollment plans had to make an active choice 
to join the 401(k) plan, whereas existing employees faced a discretionary choice of whether to switch to 
new options. By contrast, in plans with new-hire automatic enrollment, 78.7 percent of new entrants adopted 
target date funds, representing a substantial default effect. In addition, 21.7 percent of existing employees 
in these plans invested in the funds, double the rate of existing employees in voluntary choice plans. We 
take this latter result as a default-related endorsement effect: the employer’s selection of target date funds 
as a default investment for new hires influenced existing employees’ willingness to switch to the funds. 
Similar effects are observed for other measures, such as the propensity to be a pure target date investor 
(investing all of one’s savings in a single target date fund) or a mixed target date investor (combining a 
target date fund with other options). 
In terms of portfolio effects, adoption of target date funds had sizeable effects on equity share and 
risk factor exposures: relative to non-target date investors, participants’ equity share rose an average of 24 
percentage points for pure investors, and by 13 percentage points for mixed investors. Pure and mixed target 
date investors’ equity share also declined with age, whereas non-target date investors had a hump-shaped 
equity share by age. As a result of increased equity and bond market exposures, expected factor returns for 
pure investors rose by 2.3 percent per year and for mixed investors by 1.7 percent per year, relative to non-
target date investors.  Holdings in cash and company stock fell, as did uncompensated idiosyncratic risk, in 
our sample of indexed target date funds.  
Accordingly, the introduction of target date funds produced an important shift away from 
participants’ 401(k) plan portfolio selections and toward the target date managers selected by employers. 
This change will have sizeable benefits: for instance, we estimate that improved returns could raise expected 
retirement wealth by as much as 50 percent over a 30-year savings horizon, for a pure investor in a low-
cost target date series. Inasmuch as employers may have introduced the funds responding to concerns over 
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participants’ poor portfolio construction patterns, we cannot assert that the results are completely 
attributable to the ‘treatment effect’ of target date fund introduction.  Nevertheless, employees who moved 
into the target date funds could have previously made the portfolio changes on their own and realize the 
potential benefits, yet they did not.  
 Our paper is informed by an extensive literature examining how default arrangements shape 
employee savings and investment decisions, though no prior study has explored the varieties of ‘choice 
architecture’ studied here.6 There is also research asking whether peoples’ portfolio choice is influenced by 
investment illiteracy or behavioral biases,7 suggesting that retirement investment menus can shape, or 
“frame,” portfolio allocation patterns due to inertia or naïveté,8 or in reaction to excessive complexity (also 
known as “choice overload”).9  Our contribution is to show how introducing target date funds into the 
401(k) investment menu substantially altered portfolio outcomes across a diverse set of firms in voluntary 
choice and automatic enrollment as well as non-autoenrollment settings.   
In what follows, we describe key elements of the plan choice architecture relevant to the target date 
setting. We then turn to an empirical analysis of adoption behavior and changes in portfolio composition, 
before versus after the introduction of the new fund family. We conclude with a discussion of implications 
of our findings for household finance and for the potential benefits that scalable, low-cost investment advice 
can provide. 
 
                                                 
6 On the savings side, see Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009); Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2004); 
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2003, 2004, 2006); Clark and Young (2018); and Madrian and Shea (2001).  
On portfolio allocation, see Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden (2003); Ameriks and Zeldes (2004); Benartzi (2001); 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001, 2002); Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler (2007); Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009); Mitchell, 
Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi (2006a, 2006b); and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999; 2001).     
7 See Barber and Odean (2001); Bekaert, Hoyem, Hu, and Ravina (2017); Benartzi and Thaler (2001, 2002); Beshears, 
Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2018); Goda, Levy, Manchester, Sojourner and Tasoff (2019); Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007, 2011, 2014); Mottola and Utkus (2008); and Mitchell and Lusardi (2011); and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 
(2011).   
8 Examples include Agnew and Szykman (2005); Elton, Gruber and Blake (2007); Huberman and Jiang (2006); 
Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007); McDonald, Richardson, and Rietz (2019); Thaler and Sunstein (2008); Tang, 
Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2010); and Pool, Sialm, and Stefanescu (2016).   
9 See for example Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (2004); and Iyengar and Kamenica (2010). 
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401(k) Choice Architecture and Participant Portfolio Choice 
  Our analysis draws on administrative records for 880 defined contribution plans that introduced 
target date funds between January 2003 and June 2015 (a period of 12.5 years or 150 months). These data 
were provided by Vanguard, a leading US 401(k) recordkeeper, on an anonymous, restricted-access basis.10  
Table 1 illustrates how the target date funds related to their target maturity dates, and it also indicates how 
each fund utilized a different mix of passively-managed U.S. equity (including large-, mid- and small-
capitalization stocks), international equity (both developed and emerging markets), and high-quality 
domestic bonds. 11 For instance, total equity exposure in the funds for young participants (column 7) 
averaged 90 percent (in the 2040 through 2055 Funds), versus 30 percent for participants in the Income 
Fund (intended for retirees).12  
Table 1 here 
To analyze target date fund portfolio choice, we selected a research sample of over 1.2 million 
active participants from the 880 plans that introduced target date funds January 2003-June 2015.13 Both 
adoption and portfolio composition statistics were gathered for each plan 12 months following the first 
appearance of target date funds in the investment menu. Plan participants in the firm prior to the adoption 
of target date funds and still in the plan one year later were classified as existing participants; those entering 
the plan after the target date fund introduction date and still in the plan at the 12-month window were 
classified as new entrants.  
                                                 
10 All target date funds offered were Vanguard-managed. 
11 In February 2013 the funds added an allocation of international bonds.  We illustrate the allocations at the end of 
2010 because they were typical of the period we study.   
12 The Vanguard funds were all indexed except for holdings of inflation-indexed bonds available to only a small 
fraction of retired participant portfolios; accordingly, we refer to the funds as indexed.  Fund fees were below 0.20% 
during the 2003-15 period (at the end of our analysis period, even lower-cost versions of the target date funds were 
introduced in a few large plans). During 2010, a small number of target date funds offered by other investment 
managers were introduced but these accounted for below 1% of participants studied. 
13 Active 401(k) participants were those who are currently contributing to their employer’s retirement plan. We only 
include plans for which we observe plan and participant records both prior to and subsequent to the introduction of 
the target date funds. Plans transferring to the Vanguard recordkeeping service for the first time during our sample 
period and adopting target date funds at that point are excluded from our sample because we cannot observe plan 
holdings prior to the funds’ introduction. 
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This distinction is important for understanding portfolio choice decisions. When target date funds 
first arrive in the 401(k) menu, existing participants must decide whether they will switch their portfolios 
to the new funds, away from funds previously selected. Factors influencing this decision could include the 
appeal of the key features of target date funds, namely their labeling as a form of investment advice and 
their automatic age-based rebalancing feature. Factors hindering adoption could include behavioral factors 
such as inertia and procrastination, as well as an endowment effect (whereby funds already owned may 
appear to be more valuable than those not yet owned).  By contrast, new entrants would likely be more 
strongly influenced by a plan’s choice architecture. In voluntary choice plans, new entrants making 
investment decisions would need a degree of financial literacy to navigate through the entire plan 
investment menu, compare target date funds relative to other options, and construct their portfolios on their 
own. Auto-enrolled new entrants, by contrast, would be directly invested into a single target date fund. 
These latter individuals could either take no action and remain in the single target date fund assigned to 
them, or make a switch to some other portfolio with different features.  
Table 2 arrays our data by plan and individual characteristics, using period average statistics.14 Two 
key outcome variables indicate the plan choice architecture shaping participants’ choices: TDFDefault, 
indicating whether the target date series was designated as the plan’s default option; and New-hire auto 
enrollment, indicating whether the plan automatically enrolled new hires, regardless of the type of default 
fund used by the plan.15 The first column in Panel A reveals that 52 percent of participants were in plans 
where target date funds became the plan default.16 One-third (32.9 percent) of participants were in plans 
where new hires were automatically enrolled in the firm’s plan, regardless of the type of default fund used. 
                                                 
14  The average statistics pertain to plan-specific 12-month windows, rather than end-of-period characteristics.  
Appendix Table 1 provides more detail on target date fund patterns by year.  
15 Under new-hire automatic enrollment, newly eligible participants have contributions deducted automatically from 
their first eligible pay (with the right to opt out); their contributions are invested in the plan’s designated default fund.  
Our automatic enrollment indicator is for new hires only. Some employers have “swept” (i.e., automatically enrolled) 
existing eligible non-participants, because our dataset does not include an indicator for such “sweeps.” Accordingly 
our estimates should be viewed as lower bounds.   
16 A plan may designate a fund as a default for several purposes, including automatic enrollment or as a fund for 
depositing administrative corrections.   
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Panel A also indicates that 24.7 percent of participants became target date investors with the advent of the 
new funds on the menu.17 Two-thirds of these (15.7 percent) were pure target date investors contributing 
only a single target date fund, while the remaining one-third (9 percent) were mixed investors, holding a 
target date fund plus some other funds. The right side of Table 2 reports the percentage of pure, mixed, and 
non-target date investors having the plan features indicated. For instance, 72.1 percent of pure investors 
were in plans where the target date funds were the default, and 49.5 percent of pure investors were in plans 
where new hires were auto-enrolled. By contrast, fewer participants holding mixed portfolios (64.9 percent) 
and only 46.3 percent of non-target date fund investors were in plans where target date funds were the 
default. As also noted, plan menus averaged 25.6 funds in size, 48.4 percent of participants were offered 
employer stock as an investment option, and most employees (88.4 percent) had access to plan loans.   
Table 2 here 
Turning to Panel B of Table 2, we see that 19.7 percent of older participants were new entrants who 
joined their plans after target date fund introduction, within the 12-month observation period.18 Other 
participant information included 401(k) account balances and contribution patterns, plan investments, and 
participant characteristics such as age, sex, household income, job tenure, and non-retirement financial 
wealth.19 In terms of investor patterns, we see that pure target date investors were younger and more likely 
to be female, had low/moderate incomes, and held smaller account balances (Column 2, Table 2). Mixed 
target date fund investors had the opposite characteristics and above-average balances (Column 3). Because 
the panel spanned by our data included the 2008-9 financial crisis period, we also include an indicator for 
whether the 12-month plan window occurred during that period.  
 
Adoption of Target Date Funds  
                                                 
17 Consistent with prior studies of participant investment behavior, we measure portfolio allocations using contribution 
designations rather than existing portfolio holdings, as the former better reflect forward-looking intentions. 
18 Not all new entrants are new hires: while most plans do allow new hires to become immediately eligible to 
contribute, a few impose a 6- or 12-month waiting period.   
19 Household income and non-retirement wealth were provided to Vanguard by Acxiom; amounts are imputed using 
zip code (zip+4) averages.   
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To assess the distinct impacts of default versus active choice on participants’ portfolio selection, 
we estimate three multivariate models of target date fund adoption. Each  model relates a distinct measure 
of target date adoption to default, participant, plan, and other factors, as in equation (1):  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
Here TDFAdoptioni,j,t indicates whether employee i adopted a target date fund in plan j in month t, measured 
using total contributions to the target date fund (from both the employee and employer).  Model A examines 
the extensive margin of target date adoption by estimating a Probit specification. Here the dependent 
variable takes a value of 1 if the participant had contributed to a target date fund a year after the target date 
funds’ introduction to the menu (0 otherwise). The mean value of this time-weighted adoption rate was 24.7 
percent over the 2003-15 period. Model B measures the intensive margin of adoption, where the dependent 
variable in the OLS equation is the share of employees’ contributions directed to target date funds; the mean 
time-weighted value for our sample was 18.9 percent (which includes non-target date investors).20 Model 
C uses a multinomial Logit framework where the dependent variable is zero if the participant was a non-
target date investor (the reference category); 1 if the participant was a “mixed” target date fund investor 
(directing 1-99 percent of contributions to one or more target date funds); or 2 if the participant was a “pure” 
target date fund investor (directing all contributions to a single target date fund). In Model C, the mean 
time-weighted proportion of pure investors was 15.7 percent, and of mixed investors, 9.0 percent.   
All three models use the dataset described in Table 2, which included all active participants in our 
he 401(k) sample: a single observation is available for each participant 12 months following the first 
appearance of target date fund in his plan menu. Explanatory variables in equation (1) include attributes of 
the plan default architecture, DEFAULT, discussed above; plus a PLAN vector of other characteristics such 
as the size of the plan menu, the availability of plan loans; and a comprehensive set of participant 
                                                 
20 This figure includes both those holding target date funds and those with zero holdings. 
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characteristics, PARTICIPANT, including age, sex, income, 401(k) account wealth, and a measure of non-
retirement-account financial wealth. 21 
 Rather than elaborate on each estimated coefficient separately (all are reported in Appendix Table 
2), Table 3 uses these estimates to derive predicted effects for existing employees and new entrants under 
both voluntary choice and automatic enrollment architectures. The overall probability of an employee 
adopting target date funds one year after they were introduced averaged 24.7 percent. In voluntary 
enrollment plans, 10.2 percent of existing employees adopted these funds, versus the new entrant adoption 
rate almost three times as large (28.4 percent). This sizeable difference we attribute to an active choice 
effect among new plan entrants: they had to actively select investments to enroll in the plan, versus existing 
employees who had already enrolled and only had to make the switch to the new funds. In automatic 
enrollment plans, 21.7 percent of existing employees adopted the funds, and 78.7 percent of auto-enrolled 
new entrants. The former result we interpret as due to the endorsement effect, whereby the employer’s 
decision to choose the target date fund as a default investment for new entrants influenced the willingness 
of existing employees to switch.  It is more than twice as large as the adoption rate by existing employees 
in voluntary enrollment plans.  The latter effect is a very strong default effect. Panel 3 of Table 3 summarizes 
the relative sizes of these outcomes. 
Table 3 here 
 The second column of Table 3 addresses the fraction of contributions that employees directed to 
target date funds. These effects are similar in direction and magnitude to column the first column.  Column 
3 shows that automatic enrollment was especially powerful in influencing participants to become pure 
target date investors, another measure of the intensive adoption margin. Again, the same three effects are 
at work.  In terms of the active choice effect, 3.9 percent of existing employees in voluntary choice plans 
switched all of their contributions to a single target date fund when the funds were first introduced, while 
                                                 
21 The models also control for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( iν ), time fixed effects ( tτ ), and industry fixed effects, 
along with missing data dummies. All models also include a financial crisis control, defined here as the period 
September 2008-June 2009. 
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the figure rose to 14.5 percent for new enrollees.  In terms of the default effect, 74.9 percent of automatically 
enrolled new entrants were pure target investors, more than five times the voluntary enrollment new entrant 
rate. And finally, in terms of the endorsement effect, only 3.9 percent of existing employees in voluntary 
plans switched to become pure investors, but this rate rose to 14.1 percent for existing employees in 
automatic enrollment plans.  
Comparing Columns 3 and 4 also provides another lesson regarding the impact of plan choice 
architecture on portfolio choice. Specifically, new entrants to voluntary enrollment plans were roughly 
equally likely to be either pure (14.5 percent) or mixed (13.2 percent) target date fund investors, whereas 
new entrants to automatic enrollment plans were five times more likely to be pure versus mixed investors 
(74.9 versus 17.2 percent).22 One potential explanation for this difference is that employers who defaulted 
their participants into target date funds under automatic enrollment may have done so anticipating employee 
preferences for the age-based labeling or age-related rebalancing features unique to target date funds. An 
alternative explanation, consistent with the household finance literature on inertia and malleable preferences 
in financial decision-making, is that the default effect is very strong and overrides participant demand for 
mixed investments.   
Our default-related adoption effects across the 880 firms we study are similar in magnitude to prior 
individual company case studies of automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian 
and Metrick, 2004, 2005), where automatically enrolled new entrants remained entirely in the default fund, 
at rates ranging from 46 to 90 percent. Their results differ from ours due to firm-specific design factors, 
different methods of measurement, and, in most cases, the fact that their default funds tended to be low-risk 
money market funds instead of target date funds. Other results on voluntary choice are not directly 
comparable to ours as these case studies measured the effects of a default fund that had previously been 
                                                 
22  Both Agnew et al. (2012) and Ameriks et al. (2011) have reported that some participants elect a mixed strategy, 
believing that this enhances diversification; in other words they fail to recognize that each target date fund is already 
a highly-diversified multi-asset-class fund. This view may reflect a naïve understanding of diversification or a desire 
to diversify across multiple managers. Pagliaro and Utkus (2017a) demonstrate how different types of mixed investors 
diversify their portfolios, including those who alter risk levels and active/passive share.   
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included in the menu as a voluntary enrollment option, unlike in our setting where we focus on the first 
appearance of target date funds in the menu. Our measured endorsement effects are meaningfully higher 
than in previous studies: for example, Benartzi (2001) reported that employees were over 1.5 times more 
likely to invest their own contributions in employer stock when the employer match to their account was in 
stock rather than cash (29 versus 18 percent). 23 In our results, the endorsement effect is associated with a 
two to nearly four times higher propensity to hold target date funds by existing employees, depending on 
the exact measure. Moreover, the endorsement effect we measure comes from a default designation 
affecting employees’ co-workers rather than defaulted employees’ own accounts.   
We have demonstrated that plan choice architecture clearly has a potent impact on target date use, 
but other factors correlated with the outcomes are also worth mentioning (for details see Appendix Table 
2). Target date adoption was highest among low-balance participants, and it fell for those with larger 
balances. Younger participants (under age 35) were also more likely to adopt target date funds, either as 
pure or mixed investors, even after controlling for the effects of new hire auto enrollment. This suggests 
that workers were either less financially sophisticated or more willing to adopt novel strategies or 
technologies earlier in their life cycles; hence they found target date funds attractive even aside from their 
default effects. We also note that target date portfolio choice decisions did not change significantly during 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, indicating that the sharp decline in stock prices during the financial crisis 
did not alter participant demand.  
 
Portfolio Effects from Adoption of Target Date Funds  
Having examined how plan architecture influenced retirement savers’ portfolios, we next assess 
how the arrival of target date funds to fund menus shaped adopters’ portfolio risk and return characteristics. 
To this end, we compare pure and mixed target date fund investors with their non-target date fund 
                                                 
23 Evidence of an ‘endorsement effect’ resulting from an employer’s designation of employer stock as the default for 
matching contributions has been found by Benartzi (2001), Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007), and Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian (2004). 
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counterparts in terms of equity shares, portfolio return, risk, Sharpe ratios, and nonsystematic or 
idiosyncratic portfolio risk or variance (reported as a share of total variance, or NSR/TV). We further 
compare factor risk exposures of each participant subgroup.   
As with adoption behavior, we measure several aspects of participants’ portfolio allocations one 
year after the first appearance of target date funds in the plan menu. Equity allocations refer to the fraction 
of participants’ portfolios held in equities in that month.24 Risk and return characteristics are estimated 
using a six-factor asset pricing model over the prior 60 months drawing on monthly returns data for plan 
menu investments over a 17.5 year period (including the 150 month period under analysis, and the preceding 
five years). For example, if target date funds first appeared in a plan in September 2005, savers’ portfolio 
allocations were observed a year later, in September 2006, and risk and return characteristics were estimated 
for the 60 months preceding and then predicted for September 2006. Factor returns were calculated using 
six factors: the market, size, value, and momentum factors for equities, and term and default factors for 
bonds.25   
We note that over our January 1998-June 2015 analysis period, the mean equity factor return (the 
return of the equity market less the risk-free rate) was 5.95 percent (standard deviation of 16.1 percent), 
while the mean term premium for bonds (the return of long-dated government bonds less the risk-free rate) 
was 5.41 percent (standard deviation of 10.5 percent).  In other words, over the period, the risk premium 
from equities over long-dated government bonds was small, and long-dated government bonds had a 
superior Sharpe ratio to equities. Our results should be interpreted in light of how future return and risk 
characteristics might resemble, or deviate from, these historical data.  
                                                 
24 Equity share is the percentage of employer and employee contributions directed to U.S. and international equity 
funds, company stock, and a percentage of balanced and target date funds.  The equity percentage for balanced and 
target date funds is calculated based on each fund’s holdings and differs from one target age fund to another. 
25 To calculate portfolio returns over a given 60-month period, we construct a risk-loading matrix for all k investment 
options in a given plan by regressing the excess return (over Treasury bill returns) for each of the k assets on the six 
factors. The factor return for each 401(k) investment option in the predicted month is simply its factor exposure in 
that month times the average factor returns over the prior 60-month period; the participant’s factor return is simply 
the weighted average return of his or her factor exposures over the period. 
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Figure 1 summarizes equity share by age for four categories of investors: pure, mixed, non-target 
date investors, and all participants.  Most notable is the higher equity allocation at virtually all ages for pure 
and mixed target date investors versus non-target date investors.  In addition, pure and mixed investors 
followed a distinctive age-based gradient or glide path, whereas equity shares among non-target date 
investors followed a hump-shape by age. 
Figure 1 here  
Table 4 summarizes portfolio characteristics for our three groups of interest and the entire sample. 
Panel A shows the allocation of total contributions (employer and employee) by major asset class, including 
cash or principal-guaranteed funds (including money market and guaranteed investment contract funds), 
bonds, balanced or target date funds (including traditional balanced funds and static allocation or risk-based 
funds), U.S. equity funds, international equity funds, and employer stock. Panel B indicates equity shares, 
monthly systematic returns, and portfolio risk, Sharpe ratios, and nonsystematic risk.26 Panel C summarizes 
portfolio risk exposures. 
Table 4 here 
 Panel A indicates that non-target date investors held 22.3 percent of their portfolios in cash (i.e., 
money market instruments and guaranteed investment contracts), while Panel B shows they held an average 
of 63 percent in equities. By contrast, target date fund investors invested substantially more equity: 80.8 
percent for pure investors, and 76.1 percent for mixed investors.  This difference produces higher market 
risk exposures in Panel C: 61.6 percent for non-target date investors, 68.9 percent for pure, and 71 percent 
for mixed investors.  Panel B also indicates that, before controlling on other observables, target date fund 
                                                 
26 Specifically, .ˆ/ˆ/ , i
idio
itiTVNSR ΣΣ=   We estimate the variance-covariance matrix for all assets Σˆ , which in 
turn is used to estimate the total portfolio variance for the ith participant, iΣˆ .  Df ˆˆˆˆˆ
' +ΒΣΒ=Σ , where Dˆ is a 
diagonal matrix with elements computed as the square of the kεˆ estimated in equation (2).  The asset variance can be 
decomposed into systematic risk, ΒΣΒ=Σ ˆˆˆˆ ' f
sys
 and idiosyncratic risk idioDˆ .  Individual portfolio variance is then 
decomposed into its systematic and idiosyncratic components:  
idio
i
sys
itki
idiosys
tkitkitkii D Σ+Σ=+Σ=Σ=Σ ˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆˆ ,,
'
,,,,
'
,, ωωωω . 
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portfolios yielded higher monthly systematic returns (60 to 70 basis points versus 36 basis points for non-
target date fund investors), slightly higher monthly volatility (2.8-3.1 versus 2.7 percent), lower monthly 
Sharpe ratios (13.1-15.5 versus 16.7), and substantially lower idiosyncratic or uncompensated risk (3.6-
12.1 versus 25.3 percent).   The most notable result in Panel C, besides the market risk increase already 
reported, are the sharply higher bond market and default premium terms, particularly for pure investors 
where these exposures doubled (e.g., 0.201 for pure investors versus 0.096 for non-target date investors, 
for the default premium).   
We also seek to determine how these portfolio metrics vary when controlling for observable 
differences in plan choice architecture and participant characteristics. Accordingly, we estimate a 
multivariate model of the following form:   
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  (2) 
where PORTFOLIOi,j,t  is a vector of the five outcome measures of interest—equity share, return, risk, 
nonsystematic risk and Sharpe ratio—and INVESTORS is a matrix representing the type of target date fund 
investor (pure or mixed, with non-target date as the reference) and type of employee (new entrant, with 
existing employee as the reference).  PLAN and PARTICIPANT characteristics are also included as above 
in Equation (1). 27   
Table 5 presents marginal effects for equity share, where Model 1 is as in equation (2), and Model 
2 adds age interactions with target date behavior. Results in Model 1 indicate that, on average, pure target 
date fund adopters held 24 percentage points more equity compared to non-target date investors, whereas 
mixed target date investors held 13 percentage points more. Model 2 indicates that young pure investors 
(those under age 35) had an equity share averaging 34 percent points above the reference category, while 
older pure investors (those over age 55) had an equity share 7 percentage points higher. This implies an 
increase in the difference of 26 points, underscoring the fundamental feature of target date funds, namely 
                                                 
27 As in Equation (1), our models also control for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( iν ), time fixed effects ( tτ ), and 
industry fixed effects, along with missing data dummies. All models also include a financial crisis control. 
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their intentional age glide path. By contrast, among non-target date investors, the equity share was only one 
point higher for young investors and 10 points lower for the older age group, a difference of only 11 points.     
Table 5 here 
Table 6 presents estimated marginal effects for other portfolio characteristics of interest.  Monthly 
factor returns for pure target date fund investors were 19 basis points per month higher (equivalent to 2.3 
percent on an annualized basis), while mixed investors were 14 basis points per month higher (1.7 percent 
annualized). These are sizeable increases relative to the mean factor return of 44 basis points per month in 
our dataset (5.4 percent annualized).  It is also not surprising that pure (mixed) target date investors 
experienced larger portfolio standard deviations by 32 (29) basis points, given their higher equity 
allocations. Interestingly, predicted Sharpe ratios were statistically insignificantly different for target date 
investors compared to non-target date investors, suggesting that target date adoption moved participants up 
the efficient frontier compared to non-target date investors, in that they were exposed to more equity, higher 
expected returns, and more risk. Yet non-target date investors – who principally owned diversified mutual 
fund portfolios and cash equivalents – were also on the efficient frontier but at a lower risk/return point, as 
noted in Table 4.28   
Table 6 here 
One other finding from Table 6 is the large impact of target date funds on nonsystematic risk as a 
percentage of total variance. Idiosyncratic risk overall was around 21 percent of total variance across the 
entire sample. For pure investors, diversifiable risk was essentially eliminated, with an estimated marginal 
reduction of 27 percentage points; for mixed investors, it was substantially lower, by 13 percentage points. 
These results reflect the index nature of the target date funds provided to participants.     
Finally, Table 7 compares factor risk exposures across types of participants. Given that plan 
investment menus were dominated by diversified equity funds prior to the arrival of target date funds, mean 
market exposure was already 64 percent.  Pure (mixed) target date adoption raised this further, by 14 (9) 
                                                 
28 80 percent of the assets of all investors were held in low-cost Vanguard mutual funds and trusts, including both 
active and passive strategies, and the remainder in a range of non-Vanguard funds or trusts. 
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percentage points.  The second most sizeable equity factor was value (HML), at 8 percent; both the pure 
and mixed target date options raised the value exposure of adopters materially, relative to that 8 percent.  
Another clear difference is the increase in exposure to bonds among target date versus non-target date 
investors. For example, pure investors had nearly double the exposure to the default factor (10 percentage 
point increase on a mean of 12 percent) and the term premium (7 point increase on a mean of 8 percent); 
similar-sized effects apply to the term factor. Accordingly, target date funds extended participants out the 
yield curve and boosted their exposure to corporate debt, while materially reducing their cash holdings.29  
Table 7 here  
These changes represent an important change in 401(k) plan participants’ portfolio choice: adopters 
have moved away from the own-portfolio choice approach, to an environment created by the target date 
fund managers and the employers who hire them. To illustrate the potential benefits of target date adoption, 
a hypothetical 30-year-old participant earning $35,000 per year and saving 10% of wages would generate 
retirement wealth of nearly $300,000 over a 30-year period, assuming the mean excess return of 5.4% seen 
over our time period. At the end of that same period, the retirement nest egg would be an estimated 50 
percent higher for pure investors, and one third higher for mixed investors, given a low-cost well- 
diversified target date series such as that examined here.30   
We cannot attribute these effects solely to the causal treatment by target date funds, because as 
previously noted, there may be employer and participant selection effects. For instance, some employers 
could have introduced the funds or designated them as defaults under automatic enrollment because they 
felt that participants needed remedial portfolio help – for example, they may have held too much cash, 
invested too little in bonds, been under-diversified, or failed to rebalance with age. Also, in voluntary 
enrollment settings, participants could have selected target date funds because of the convenient retirement-
                                                 
29 This is consistent with anecdotal observations about inexperienced investors and their relative lack of understanding 
of, and exposure to, the bond market (a bond market participation problem). 
30 This computation uses the mean return changes for pure and mixed target-date investors, respectively 2.4% and 
1.7% annualized, from Table 5. We assumed 1% real wage growth, and importantly no leakage from retirement 
accounts over the period; the calculations follow the end-of-period convention. Calculations are available from the 
authors on request. 
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date labeling which acts as an implicit advice feature, or the convenience of the age-based rebalancing.  
Nevertheless, we are convinced that target date funds are associated with sizeable shifts in retirement 
savers’ portfolio risk factors and potential increases in future retirement wealth among adopters, relative to 
non-target date investors. Moreover, as Tang, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2010) showed, adopters could 
have “rolled their own” portfolios to mimic the age-relevant target date fund mix using funds available 
prior to the inclusion of the target date funds on the menu—but chose not to until the introduction of target 
date funds.  
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 Retirement savers in U.S. 401(k) plans have traditionally been responsible for constructing their 
own retirement investment portfolios, but the advent of target date funds has altered the playing field for 
workers saving for retirement. We examine 880 retirement plans covering 1.2 million participants to 
highlight key behavioral mechanisms shaping target date adoption, and in turn, how target date fund 
adoption has substantively changed portfolio risks and returns among adopters.  
We have identified three distinct behavioral effects influencing adoption when target date funds 
are introduced in either voluntary or automatic enrollment environments. One is an active choice effect in 
voluntary enrollment plans: here, 28.4 percent of new entrants adopted target date funds in their 401(k) 
portfolios, compared to only 10.2 percent of existing employees. The second is a substantial default effect 
in new hire automatic enrollment plans: 78.7 percent of new entrants in plans with new-hire automatic 
enrollment adopted target date funds, versus 28.4 percent in voluntary plans. The third is a default-related 
endorsement effect: that is, in new-hire automatic enrollment plans, 21.7 percent of existing employees not 
subject to auto-enrollment invested in the funds, double the rate of existing employees in voluntary choice 
plans.   
We have also shown that retirement portfolios are dramatically altered when target date funds are 
adopted in 401(k) plans, as demonstrated by important changes in portfolio risk-taking. For example, pure 
investors adopting a single fund had a higher equity share (+24 percentage points), a sharper age equity 
18 
 
share gradient (+26 points), and higher factor returns (+2.3% annualized), versus non-target date holders. 
Besides boosting equity shares for pure and mixed investors, target date funds also produced a distinctive 
age-based gradient in risk-taking, compared to a hump-shaped equity allocation among non-target date 
investors. We show that target date participants took on the factor exposures embedded in the target date 
series offered by fund managers and selected by employers. In our data, that entailed more market risk 
exposure, greater exposures to term and default premia, and reduced idiosyncratic risk.31    
These changes are likely to be welfare-enhancing, under the joint assumptions that the target date 
design represents an efficient portfolio frontier (selected by sponsors and fund managers), and that workers 
without target date funds would fail to construct efficient portfolios or would select suboptimal points on 
that frontier due to financial illiteracy and behavioral biases. One illustration of the potential welfare 
benefits stemming from having higher equity exposure is that pure target date investors in a low-cost 
broadly diversified target date series could potentially realize up to 50 percent more retirement wealth, 
relative to non-target date investors.  For mixed investors, the wealth increment could be up to 30 percent.       
Given these estimates of potential benefits, one might ask what plan sponsors and policymakers 
might do if they wished to boost target date adoption among existing 401(k) participants. One approach 
might be to use ‘reenrollment,’ whereby the plan sponsors could transfer existing employees’ investments 
into age-specific target date funds (or any other default fund), with advance notification to employees and 
the right to opt out. Reenrollment could lead to similar changes as outlined here for existing non-target date 
investors.32 Our results also point to the potential effects of providing low-cost, scalable investment advice 
more broadly. That is, low-cost lifecycle investment algorithms such as target date funds or robo-advice 
services33 could potentially help reduce portfolio construction deficiencies in other settings such as retail 
investment accounts or personal pensions, possibly reducing the heterogeneity of returns across households 
(Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish, 2019).   
                                                 
31 A similar result is reported by Keim and Mitchell (2018) who analyzed target date fund introduction at a single 
firm. 
32 For more discussion of reenrollment, see Pagliaro and Utkus (2016, 2017b) 
33 See Agnew and Mitchell (2019). 
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Table 1.  Target Date Fund Characteristics 
 
 
Note: Fund asset mix measured as of December 2010. Source: Authors’ tabulations using 
Vanguard data; see text. 
 
TDF Fund
Participant 
Age in 2010
Equity 
allocation 
(%)
U.S. stocks 
(%)
Non-U.S. 
stocks (%)
U.S. 
nominal 
bonds (%)
U.S. 
inflation-
protected 
bonds (%) Cash (%)
2055 20 90 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2050 25 90 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2045 30 90 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2040 35 90 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2035 40 89 62.5 26.8 10.8 0.0 0.0
2030 45 82 57.2 24.5 18.3 0.0 0.0
2025 50 74 52.0 22.3 25.8 0.0 0.0
2020 55 67 46.7 20.0 33.3 0.0 0.0
2015 60 59 41.3 17.7 40.0 1.0 0.0
2010 65 49 34.0 14.6 40.4 10.7 0.4
2005 70 34 24.0 10.3 43.9 17.9 3.9
Income 75 30 21.0 9.0 45.0 20.0 5.0
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Table 2.  Descriptive Characteristics of Plans and Participants 
 
A. Plan Features and Participant Outcomes (% of accounts) 
 
 
 
 
B. Participant Attributes (% of accounts) 
 
 
Note: Source: Authors’ tabulations using Vanguard data; see text and Appendix Table 3. 
All            
Pure 
TDF 
Investors 
Mixed 
TDF 
Investors 
Non-TDF 
Investors 
Choice architecture features  
TDF Default 52.0 72.1 64.9 46.3
New-hire auto enrollment 32.9 49.5 27.4 30.1
TDF adoption  
TDF investor 24.7 100.0 100.0 0.0
Pure TDF investor 15.7 100.0 0.0 0.0
Mixed TDF investor 9.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Other plan features
N Funds offered (mean) 25.6 24.5 24.4 26.0
Employer stock offered  48.4 46.6 53.0 48.3
Loans offered 88.4 88.0 92.8 87.9
N plans 880 852 824 880
N unique accounts 1,262,506 198,242 114,161 950,103
All            
Pure 
TDF 
Investors 
Mixed 
TDF 
Investors 
Non-TDF 
Investors 
New entrants 19.7 54.5 24.2 11.8
Log account balance (2015$) 9.9 8.1 10.1 10.2
Job tenure (years) 10.0 5.0 8.7 11.3
Young (%<35) 25.1 41.3 28.2 21.4
Middle (% 35-55) 59.6 49.3 59.2 61.9
Old (% >55) 15.2 9.4 12.6 16.8
Male (%) 69.4 65.7 69.3 70.2
Low HH income (% <$62.5K) 31.0 37.9 27.0 30.0
Mid. HH income (% $62.5-$87.5K) 26.7 28.9 26.9 26.2
High HH income (% >$87.5K) 42.3 33.1 46.0 43.7
Low non-ret. fin. wealth (% <$7.3K) 17.9 28.2 17.4 15.9
Mid. non-ret. fin, wealth (% $7.3K-$61.2K) 32.2 39.0 34.2 30.6
High non-ret. fin. wealth (% >$61.2K) 49.9 32.8 48.4 53.6
Financial crisis (% of year) 8.1 8.6 10.1 7.8
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Table 3.  Summary of Predicted Effects of Plan Choice Architecture on Target Date Fund Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Predicted effects derived from model estimates appearing in Appendix Table 2 (Probit model of probability of adoption; OLS model of total contributions, 
which includes both employer and employee contributions; and a multinomial Logit model of pure versus mixed versus non-target date adopters), with all other 
variables held at sample means.  ‘New entrants’ are participants who enrolled with target date funds available in the investment menu; “existing participants” are 
those who enrolled prior to target date funds being introduced in the menu.   Adoption effects are measured one year after first target date fund appearance in menu. 
Source: Authors’ tabulations using Vanguard data; see text and Appendix Table 3.  
  
 
 
 
 
In percent
Sample mean 24.7 18.9 15.7 9.0
Choice Architecture
I. Voluntary choice
A.  Existing employees 10.2 7.6 3.9 5.6
B.  New entrants 28.4 27.4 14.5 13.2
II. Auto enroll of new entrants to TDF
A.  Existing employees 21.7 18.7 14.1 7.9
B.  New entrants 78.7 73.2 74.9 17.2
III.  Summary of effects
Active choice effect (IB v. IA) 2.8 3.6 3.8 2.3
Endorsement effect (IIA v. IA) 2.1 2.5 3.6 1.4
Default effect (IIB v. IB) 2.8 2.7 5.2 1.3
Probability of 
TDF Adoption 
(1)
Total 
Contributions to 
TDFs (2)
Probability of 
Pure TDF (3)
Probability of 
Mixed TDF (4)
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Table 4.  Contribution Allocations and Portfolio Characteristics of Participants in Plans Adopting Target Date Funds 
 
 
 
Note: All of the following β differences are significant at the 1% level: new entrants versus existing employees; pure versus mixed investors; pure versus nontarget 
date fund; and mixed versus nontarget date fund investors. Source: Authors’ computations using Vanguard data; see text and Appendix Table 3 for variable 
definitions. 
A. Contribution allocations (%)
Cash Bonds Balanced/ 
TDF
U.S. Equities International 
Equities
Company 
Stock
All investors 17.3 6.4 29.6 34.3 6.6 5.7
Non TDF investors 22.3 7.7 13.7 41.9 7.7 6.8
Pure TDF investors 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mixed TDF investors 5.9 7.2 39.9 31.1 9.3 6.5
B. Portfolio characteristics (%) Six-factor CAPM, Predicted
Equity share Monthly  
Returns
Monthly Risk 
(σ)
Sharpe Ratio NSR/TV
All investors 67.0 0.44 2.75 16.2 20.7
Non TDF investors 63.0 0.36 2.71 16.7 25.3
Pure TDF investors 80.8 0.70 2.77 15.5 3.6
Mixed TDF investors 76.1 0.60 3.07 13.1 12.1
C1. Portfolio risk exposures
β(Mkt) β(SMB) β(HML) β(UMD) β(Default) β(Term) β(RMSE)
All investors 0.636 -0.011 0.084 -0.008 0.117 0.080 0.010
   New entrants 0.621 -0.024 0.086 -0.002 0.150 0.099 0.008
   Existing employees 0.640 -0.008 0.083 -0.010 0.109 0.075 0.010
Non TDF investors 0.616 0.001 0.079 -0.011 0.096 0.065 0.010
Pure TDF investors 0.689 -0.073 0.099 0.005 0.201 0.138 0.007
Mixed TDF investors 0.710 -0.006 0.093 -0.005 0.151 0.103 0.011
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Table 5.  Marginal Effects of Equity Share and Target Date Treatment  
 
 
 
Note: Equity share is percentage of participant contributions direct to stock market investments.  Controls 
include plan-level controls for number of funds, employer stock, and loans offered.  Standard errors clustered 
at the plan level. * Significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  Source: Authors’ computations using Vanguard 
data; see text and Appendix Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
  
Mean
TDF investors (%)
Pure TDF Investors  15.7 0.240 ** 0.212 **
Mixed TDF Investors 9.0 0.126 ** 0.116 **
Young*Pure TDF Investors (%) 6.5 0.125 **
Old*Pure TDF Investors (%) 1.5 -0.139 **
Young*Mixed TDF Investors (%) 2.6 0.062 **
Old*Mixed TDF Investors (%) 1.1 -0.043 **
Choice architecture
New-hire auto enrollment  (%) 32.9 -0.017 -0.018  
New entrants  19.7 -0.016 -0.022
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2015$) 9.9 0.024 ** 0.024 **
Job tenure (years) 10.0 -0.002 ** -0.002 **
Young (% <35) 25.1 0.046 ** 0.010 *
Old (% >55) 15.2 -0.117 ** -0.100 **
Male (%) 69.4 0.032 ** 0.032 **
HH income low (% <$62.5K) 31.0 -0.026 ** -0.027 **
HH income high (%>$87.5K) 42.3 0.015 ** 0.015 **
Wealth low (%<$7.3K) 17.9 -0.028 ** -0.029 **
Wealth high (%>$61.2K) 49.9 0.025 ** 0.024 **
Financial crisis (% months) 8.1 -0.012 -0.010
Intercept 0.445 ** 0.458 **
Controls
Observations
Number of clusters (plans)
R-squared 0.151 0.158
Mean of dependent variable 67.0% 67.0%
Equity Share 
(2)
1,262,506
880
Yes
Equity Share 
(1)
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Table 6.  Marginal Effects of Portfolio Outcomes and Target Date Treatment  
 
 
Note: See text for definition of dependent variables.  Controls include plan-level controls for number of funds, employer stock and loans offered.  
Standard errors clustered at the plan level.  * Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.   Source: Authors’ computations using Vanguard data; see 
text and Appendix Table 3 for variable definitions.  
Mean
TDF investors (%)
Pure TDF Investors  15.7 0.0019 * 0.0032 ** -0.0687 -0.2703 **
Mixed TDF Investors 9.0 0.0014 * 0.0029 ** -0.0348 -0.1344 **
Choice architecture
New-hire auto enrollment  (%) 32.9 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0722 0.0051
New entrants  19.7 -0.0006 -0.0012 ** -0.0209 0.0225  
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2015$) 9.9 0.0004 0.0008 ** -0.0015 -0.0165 **
Job tenure (years) 10.0 0.0000 -0.0001 ** 0.0022 ** 0.0015 **
Young (% <35) 25.1 0.0002 0.0013 ** -0.0079 -0.0019
Old (% >55) 15.2 -0.0006 -0.0041 ** 0.0401 ** 0.0440 **
Male (%) 69.4 0.0003 0.0013 ** 0.0089 -0.0033
HH income low (% <$62.5K) 31.0 -0.0004 ** -0.0011 ** 0.0028 0.0182 **
HH income high (%>$87.5K) 42.3 -0.0001 0.0005 ** -0.0111 * -0.0080 **
Wealth low (%<$7.3K) 17.9 0.0001 -0.0009 ** 0.0250 * 0.0224 **
Wealth high (%>$61.2K) 49.9 -0.0002 0.0009 ** -0.0182 ** -0.0148 **
Financial crisis (% months) 8.1 -0.0528 ** 0.0006 -1.3855 ** 0.0385 *
Intercept 0.0320 ** 0.0286 ** 1.0203 ** 0.3548 **
Controls
Observations
Number of clusters (plans)
R-squared 0.514 0.247 0.447 0.179
Mean of dependent variable 0.0044 0.0275 0.1621 0.2069
1,262,506
880
Sharpe       
Ratio
Monthly   
Return 
Monthly Risk 
(σ) NSR/TV
Yes
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Table 7.  Marginal Effects of Portfolio Risk Exposures and Target Date Treatment 
 
 
Note: See text for definition of dependent variables.  Controls include plan-level controls for number of funds, employer stock and loans offered.  
Standard errors clustered at the plan level.  * Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  Source: Authors’ computations using Vanguard data; see text 
and Appendix Table 3 for variable definitions.  
Mean
TDF investors (%)
Pure TDF Investors  15.7 0.135 ** -0.084 ** 0.026 ** 0.012 ** 0.101 ** 0.072 ** -0.002 **
Mixed TDF Investors 9.0 0.090 ** -0.015 ** 0.013 ** 0.004 ** 0.050 ** 0.040 ** 0.001 *
Choice architecture
New-hire auto enrollment  (%) 32.9 -0.018 -0.002 -0.011 * 0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 *
New entrants  19.7 -0.015 0.014 ** 0.000 0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 0.000
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2015$) 9.9 0.022 ** 0.003 ** 0.002 ** 0.000 0.002 ** 0.000 0.000 **
Job tenure (years) 10.0 -0.002 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 * -0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 *
Young (% <35) 25.1 0.032 ** 0.005 ** 0.011 ** 0.003 ** 0.011 ** -0.007 ** 0.001 **
Old (% >55) 15.2 -0.100 ** -0.009 ** -0.013 ** -0.001 ** -0.010 ** 0.012 ** -0.001 **
Male (%) 69.4 0.028 ** 0.006 ** 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.004 ** 0.001 **
HH income low (% <$62.5K) 31.0 -0.026 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** 0.000 -0.003 ** -0.001 * 0.000 **
HH income high (%>$87.5K) 42.3 0.015 ** 0.004 ** 0.002 ** 0.000 0.002 ** 0.001 0.000 **
Wealth low (%<$7.3K) 17.9 -0.028 ** -0.002 ** -0.001 0.000 -0.003 * -0.001 * 0.000 **
Wealth high (%>$61.2K) 49.9 0.024 ** 0.003 ** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 **
Financial crisis (% months) 8.1 -0.004 -0.005 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001
Intercept 0.451 ** -0.048 ** 0.065 ** -0.022 ** 0.027 * 0.053 ** 0.007 **
Controls
Observations
Number of clusters (plans)
R-squared 0.111 0.140 0.098 0.111 0.247 0.151 0.151
Mean of dependent variable 0.636 -0.011 0.084 -0.008 0.117 0.080 0.010
β(Term) β(RMSE)β(Mkt)
Yes
880
1,262,506
β(SMB) β(HML) β(UMD) β(Default)
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Figure 1.  Equity Share by Age and Investor Type   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Appendix Table 1. Year-by-Year Target Date Fund Adoption Patterns and Other Trends   
 
Source: Authors’ computations using Vanguard data; see text and Appendix Table 3 for variable definitions.  
By Year
Entire 
Period
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2003-2014
Default architecture
TDFDefault (%) 0.0 8.0 14.9 29.1 70.5 84.6 66.9 93.5 80.7 80.3 14.7 72.1 52.0
New-hire auto enrollment (%) 0.0 0.1 26.5 43.2 38.1 37.7 35.5 45.2 31.9 2.8 11.6 36.2 32.9
New entrant (%) 16.1 13.9 22.6 18.2 26.7 13.1 9.1 12.1 22.2 14.5 11.9 15.8 19.7
Other plan characteristics
N funds offered (mean) 69.2 38.5 19.0 22.7 25.8 24.7 27.1 28.5 24.4 29.1 28.9 23.5 25.6
Employer stock offered (%) 0.0 7.4 58.7 45.3 56.3 54.0 51.5 14.2 0.0 0.0 84.0 0.0 48.4
Loan offered (%) 3.5 56.7 88.7 96.1 94.1 83.8 91.2 98.8 92.7 76.8 97.1 95.8 88.4
SA enabled (%) 100.0 60.9 28.8 32.3 63.3 74.0 86.3 81.9 87.7 79.0 11.9 70.4 55.4
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2015$) 10.1 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.5 10.1 10.3 10.2 9.4 10.4 11.4 9.1 9.9
Job tenure (years) 4.6 8.2 11.5 8.8 9.5 11.0 13.0 10.7 8.8 8.9 12.2 9.7 10.0
Young (<35, %) 26.4 26.2 23.2 26.5 25.7 25.6 21.4 23.0 23.1 24.7 23.1 22.8 25.1
Middle (35-55, %) 62.3 60.5 61.5 59.3 60.7 57.8 57.3 58.3 57.6 59.0 54.3 53.2 59.6
Old (>55, %) 11.3 13.3 15.3 14.3 13.6 16.5 21.3 18.7 19.3 16.3 22.6 24.1 15.2
Male (%) 30.9 62.6 59.4 72.6 75.6 65.2 71.3 77.9 64.1 60.6 79.6 69.1 69.4
HH income low (<$62.5K, %) 22.0 27.3 33.1 33.8 32.1 29.5 29.2 28.5 32.9 27.3 21.4 19.1 31.0
HH income medium ($62.5-$87.5K, %) 22.6 26.1 29.3 25.0 26.9 26.2 27.1 26.2 33.9 27.5 22.6 33.7 26.7
HH income high (>$87.5K) 55.4 46.5 37.6 41.2 41.0 44.2 43.7 45.3 33.2 45.2 56.0 47.2 42.3
Low (<$7.3K, %) 3.4 9.1 15.5 19.7 19.7 18.1 18.8 18.9 33.7 20.8 18.7 21.6 17.9
Average ($7.3K-$61.2K, %) 16.4 23.0 31.9 31.3 34.9 33.2 35.9 32.3 31.3 29.8 26.7 32.4 32.2
High (>$61.2K, %) 80.3 67.9 52.6 49.0 45.4 48.7 45.3 48.8 35.0 49.4 54.6 46.1 49.9
Financial Crisis
Financial crisis (% of year) 0 0 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 8.1
TDF adoption (% of accounts)
TDF investor 1.7 10.1 19.5 25.4 26.5 29.0 21.2 40.3 51.2 50.5 12.2 37.4 24.7
Pure TDF investor 1.1 6.8 11.3 16.4 18.0 16.5 13.0 24.1 35.8 40.4 5.8 22.2 15.7
Mixed TDF investor 0.6 3.3 8.2 9.0 8.5 12.5 8.2 16.2 15.4 10.1 6.4 15.2 9.0
Observations
N plans 6 93 109 157 168 129 63 48 43 27 22 15 880
N accounts 11,310 87,514 189,648 204,932 403,984 208,196 46,046 42,177 8,224 19,282 37,172 4,021 1,262,506
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Appendix Table 2.  Estimated Determinants of Participant Target Date Fund Adoption Patterns 
 
 
Source: Probit model of probability of adoption; OLS model of total contributions, which includes both employer and employee contributions; and 
a multinomial logit model of pure versus mixed versus non-target date adopters.  ‘New entrants’ are participants who enrolled with target date 
funds available in the investment menu; “existing participants” are those who enrolled prior to target date funds being introduced in the menu.   
Adoption effects are measured one year after first target date fund appearance in menu.  Source: Authors’ computations using Vanguard data; see 
text and Appendix Table 3 for variable definitions. 
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Appendix Table 3. Variable Descriptions 
 
 
Variable Description
TDF adoption (0/1)  =1 if employee contributes to TDF funds, 0 else
Contributions to TDFs (%) Percentage of monthly contribution invested into TDF funds
Pure TDF Investors   =1 if employee only contributes to TDF funds, 0 else
Mixed TDF Investors  =1 if employee contributes to TDF and non-TDF funds, 0 else
Equity Allocations (%) Percentage of monthly contribution invested into equity assets
Monthly return (%) Monthly predicted factor return
Monthly Standard deviation (σ) (%) Monthly predicted standard deviation of factor return
Nonsystematic risk/total variance (NSR/TV) (%) Ratio of non-sysmatic risk of total portfolio variance
Sharpe Ratio Ratio of monthly predicted factor return to monthly predicted standard deviation
β(Mkt) Weighted estimated coefficient of benchmark Mkt
β(SMB) Weighted estimated coefficient of benchmark SMB
β(HML) Weighted estimated coefficient of benchmark HML
β(UMD) Weighted estimated coefficient of benchmark UMD
β(Defaultprem) Weighted estimated coefficient of benchmark Defaultprem
β(Termprem) Weighted estimated coefficient of benchmark Termprem
β(RMSE) Weighted estimated Root MSE
Default  =1 if TDF fund as default in plan, 0 else
New entrants  =1 if employee began contribution after TDF introduction, = else
New-hire auto enrollment  =1 if the month is after Vanguard TDF auto enrollment date; =0 else
N Funds offered # funds offered in plan
Employer stock offered  =1 if plan offers company stock; =0 else
Loan offered  =1 if plan offers loan; =0 else
Log balance (mean 2015$)  Natural logarithm of balance in 2015$
Job tenure (years) Years of job tenure
Young (age<35)  =1 if employee's age<35, =0 else
Old (age>55)  =1 if employee's age>55, =0 else
Male  =1 if employee is male, = 0 else
HH income low (<$62.5K)  =1 if HH income<$62,500, =0 else
HH income high (>$87.5K)  =1 if HH income>87,500, =0 else
Wealth low (<$7.3K)  =1 if HH wealth<$7.3k, =0 else
Wealth high (>$61.2K)  =1 if HH wealth>$61.2k; =0 else
Financial crisis  =1 if month is between 200809 and 200903, =0 else
